But the era of neglect now seems to be passing for a recent article by Michael Doucet in the Urban History Review has attempted to put Toronto's unique development in historical perspective.
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Doucet attributes Toronto
1 s success to the 1921 municipal takeover and the formation of the TTC. He argues that mass transit fared best in countries where it was strictly regulated or municipally owned and most poorly in the United States where "essentially laissez faire conditions" prevailed. As for Toronto -and presumably Canada -"the history of mass transit operations" reveals "a rather interesting intermixture of the attitudes toward ownership ... evolving elsewhere."
He therefore depicts Toronto as a half-way house between British municipal socialism and American free enterprise. While it experimented with private ownership, it eventually realized its error and opted for municipalization. Toronto thus muddled through, Doucet implies, to a peculiarly Canadian solution to its transit difficulties. As a result, its public transportation, while not as healthy as that of Great Britain, at least avoided the wholesale dismemberment that befell American private 2 systems after 1945.
The argument, though persuasive, has a problem: municipal ownership of mass public transit is now as widespread in the United States as in either Great Britain or Canada. Perhaps to circumvent this difficulty Doucet emphasizes the timing of Toronto 1 s municipal takeover. It came in 1921 when it still made economic sense to invest in street railways. Consequently, the TTC spent $50 million -most of it by 1923 -to acquire, modernize, and extend the private system. As a result, Toronto developed a "stake in public transit ... too high" to abandon. Doucet further contends that, "since most of the money had been expended on the street railway network, the trolley was also assured of a place in the mass transit future of Toronto." Its survival was in fact vital as in "many cities" the scrapping of the local street railway "marked the 
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Municipal ownership played at most a minor role in preserving Toronto's streetcars and in keeping its transit system viable. Evidence from other cities indicates that municipalization was no panacea for transportation ills, even if undertaken in 1921. Certainly it worked no wonders in Seattle, Detroit, and Windsor, the three cities that took over their street railways at approximately the same time as Toronto did.
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Seattle in 1918 "paid a vast sum for a fleet of outmoded cars and a set of deteriorating tracks.
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Its transportation system by the 1960s counted among the continent 1 s most anemic. Public transit in Detroit has been no healthier even though, a city department has owned and operated it since 1922.
As for mass transit across the river in Windsor, it has suffered the financial complaints endemic to small city systems since the municipal 4 takeover in 1920.
The example of Detroit suggests, moreover, that the $50 million spent by the TTC between 1921 and 1923 had little future bearing on either the vitality of mass transit or the survival of streetcars in Toronto.
Detroit also had a large investment to protect after 1922: $22 million paid for the property of the local traction monopoly and a further $18 million spent improving and extending it during the first three years of municipal ownership. Neither municipal ownership nor the "stake" of $40 million saved Detroit's public system from dismemberment. The original investment after all was not large enough to justify losses of $5 million a year in the mid1950s. Toronto would probably have sold its streetcars too if they had contributed to similar deficits. But streetcars, routes, and frequent headways survived in Toronto because they paid for themselves. The street railway system continued to be regarded as an asset because it remained an asset. (Montreal, 1975), 9, 63; John Anderson Miller, Fares, Please! (New York, 1941 , 1960 , ch. 10.
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(most streetcars still required both a conductor and a driver). Moreover, the flexibility of buses -the freedom from tracks and overhead wiresenabled them to follow commuters into the suburbs. They therefore increased the transit offerings of most cities even where street railway operations contracted.
In the 1920s smaller cities like Bay City, Michigan and Everett, Washington switched entirely to buses; their transit receipts had never been large enough to pay the fixed costs of rail transportation. As well, several dozen American cities found that they could, thanks to the motor bus, afford public transit for the first time. Paradoxically, the wartime surge in traffic hastened the demise of North America's street railways as systems already prematurely aged by the neglect of hard times degenerated even more rapidly under the stress of war. So extreme was the equipment shortage in most cities that streetcars "could not be removed from service to make even normal overhauls, due to the incessant demands upon" them. It was ironic: street railways were making large profits but their systems were disintegrating. The Canadian government did not help matters, furthermore, by siphoning off the industry's first profits in more than a decade through a wartime excess profits tax. Edmonton and Hamilton in 1951; Saskatoon, Regina, and Calgary in 1950; Halifax in 1949; Thunder Bay in 1946 -1947 and Kitchener in 1946. postwar order for PCC cars.
What now seems far-sighted probably struck most observors in the late 1940s as conservative and backward. Other systems were embracing the new transportation technology while the TTC, more set in its ways, stuck with streetcars. Once again it had little alternative, for 290 of its trams were less than eight years old. To pay for themselves, these cars had to run for a decade more. But their continued operation was contingent on modernizing the rest of the rail fleet. (October, 1975) , 571-582. Yunker and Sinha explode the greatest myth of all -that the streetcar is more energy-efficient than its rubber-wheeled competition. Writing in 1975, they conclude that "transportation systems utilizing full and medium sized diesel-powered buses have the highest energy-use efficiency for all ... intra-urban travel modes." They included surface, elevated, and underground rail lines and trolleybuses in their study. the TTC 1 s purchases ceased; it was evidently contemplating phasing out its street railway system. Yet it hesitated long enough, for streetcars to come back into vogue and Toronto's system survived to the relief of traditionalists, ecologists, and rail fans everywhere.
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Timing, as Doucet suggests, was crucial to the survival of an important consideration in balancing its books. Urban growth throughout the northern and western United States has approximated the Chicago pattern, with massive population shifts undermining the viability of public transit. Toronto's growth, however, has basically followed the course charted by developers in the late nineteenth century. As the city has expanded, the TTC has had to extend its lines but the Commission has not had to reorient their direction, for there has been no ghetto or forbidden district large enough to distort Toronto's development. The TTC, in sum, has not had to make the adjustments forced upon American transit systems by that country's racial problems.
The TTC has also enjoyed the benefits of Canada's relative poverty, especially in the 1920s, the decisive decade for mass transit in most North American cities. Canadians were then -and later -unable to indulge their passion for automobiles to the same degree as could Americans. Poorer to start with, they also had to pay more for an automobile -41-54 per cent in 1926 depending on make -because of high tariffs, freight charges, and sales taxes. As a result, Canadians in 1925 owned less than half as many motor cars per capita. Torontonians, wealthy by Canadian standards, more closely fitted the American mold, as Canadians, owning fewer automobiles, made greater use of mass transit. As Table I More disastrous for public transit, however, was the loss of the highly profitable short-haul traffic in the downtown area itself as congestion convinced people that they could walk faster than streetcars could crawl. The reduced use of mass transit in the urban core, coupled with the outward march of the city, so lengthened the average trip that American companies, even in the 1920s, were losing money on the bulk of their fares.
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The correlation coefficient used is r with the standard test for significance for when N<50. See Dean J. Champion, Basic Statistics for Social Research (Scranton, Penn., 1970), 194ff. or taking in a show to narrow the gap between their off-peak and peak loads. But the automobile was above all else a "pleasure vehicle" and it was precisely these activities that it served best. The supreme irony came in cities where motor cars drew off the cream of the traffic heading for the amusement parks that street railways had built to boost their Sunday and evening business. With automobiles so destructive of mass transit, Canadians were perhaps fortunate in the 1920s -and sincein being unable to afford as many as could Americans. However, it would be wrong to make a virtue of economic necessity: it was after all the lack of alternatives rather than superior planning or insight that kept Torontonians and commuters in other Canadian urban centres on overcrowded 32 trams and buses.
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In discussing the impact of automobiles, three variables have been identified that together determine the viability of a transit system: the riding habit, the short haul, and the relationship between peak and off-
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Fogelson, Fragmented Metropolis, 179; Wilson, "Some Problems," 101-105. Scarcity has been a powerful force in shaping the character of Canadian cities and needs more study by historians. For a discussion of its importance in American urban development see Zane L. Miller, "Scarcity, Abundance, and American Urban History," Journal of Urban History, 4 (February, 1978), 131-156. peak loads. All three variables hinge to a great extent on urban population density. Â compact city is more likely to have a high, riding habit, numerous short hauls, and a low peak at rush hour. Its transit system will accordingly have a greater chance for survival than that of a sprawling, low-density city like Los Angeles or Dallas. Toronto had the second highest density of any major North American municipality in 1921 and several other cities in Eastern Canada also had extraordinarily high densities for communities their size. As Table II Yet the public believed them fabulously lucrative. Countless newspaper editorials and articles had convinced them that street railways were unusually profitable. The companies knew better but had to be careful in what they said, lest they alarm potential bondholders.
Like most myths, the belief in a street railway El Dorado had some basis in fact -namely, the large profits accumulated by systems in the larger metropolises during the last few years of horsecar operations in the late 1880s and early 1890s when the combination of a fixed fare -five cents in most North American cities -and a secular decline in prices made street railways in places like Detroit, Chicago, Toronto, and even Hamilton, excellent investments. But the profitability 37 of most systems declined or ended with electrification.
First of all, many cities saw the switchover in motive power as an opportunity to rewrite and toughen street railway franchises. Hamilton, in fact, set terms so severe in 1892 that they had to be relaxed only four years later when the street railway complained that it could no longer attract capital. Even then the line remained "remarkably unprofitable, 11 missing dividends from 1900 through 1911. Winnipeg, on the other hand, simply refused to grant the existing horsecar company an electric railway franchise, letting the contract instead to a syndicate headed by
William Mackenzie and James Ross, the principals in the Toronto Railway
Company, who promised to provide service to any area with a specified 38 population density -a formula that ensured overbuilding of the system. Most onerous, however, was the requirement of Immediate electrification.
Toronto, like other North American cities, was in a rush to electrify its street railways in order to ease over-crowding in the urban core by opening up new land for development. Also, it did not want to fall behind its rivals in the trappings of modernity and progress. Yet it paid a city to wait a few years for competition between Westinghouse and General Electric to drive down the cost of equipping an electric railway. The price of a set of two electric motors fell $3,800 between 1889 and 1895. But Toronto was in too much of a hurry to shop for bargains and it pressured its street 39 railway promoters into premature electrification.
Most promoters were of course happy to oblige, both because of the profits they expected to make from real estate speculation and stock jobbing and because they misunderstood the economics of operating an electric street railway. From their experience with horsecars they drew the erroneous conclusion that passenger volume and operating costs were the key elements in determining profit and loss. Horsecar systems had low fixed costs -it was not expensive to buy a team of horses, a light car, and a barn. It was, however, costly feeding and caring for horses. An electric system had the opposite problem -it had lower operating costs and consequently reduced the operating ratio of American street railways by 22 per cent between 1890 and 1902, but it also had much higher fixed costs because it needed a power plant, overhead lines, and heavier rails 
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Bureau of Census, Railways 1902, 123-124; Heihaan, "Chicago Traction," 335; McShane, Technology and Reform, 62; Constance M. Green, Washington: Capital City, 1879 -1950 (Princeton, 1963 , 51; Wilson, "Some Problems," 87. struction of redundant electric generating plants. Company bookkeepers therefore clamored for mergers, as did stock market insiders who realized that they could gain far more from promoting a street railway than from running it. As a result, a great merger movement swept the traction industry between 1895 and 1905. Numerous bankruptcies followed in its wake, for it generally took several different steps and layers of debt to fashion the final monopoly. Overcapitalized by a third on the average, American street railways had difficulty thereafter even paying their debt charges. They had crippled themselves trying to reach the same blissful state of monopoly bestowed so readily 44 on Canadian operators.
IV
The pressure of competition gave many American street railways a special incentive to build themselves into bankruptcy. But over-expansion was not simply the result of excessive competition for it was endemic throughout North America, with municipally-owned systems in western Canada as susceptible to it as was private enterprise in Pittsburgh or New York. Over-expansion was in part a function of speed. Few companies resisted the temptation to push their systems to their technological, as opposed to economic limits.
Municipal governments also pressured street railways into over-building.
Indeed, the price for ignoring the vested interest of city councils in expansion was often the loss of franchise, as in Toronto, or the loss of monopoly, as in the United States. Most municipal politicians in North America wanted rapid suburbanization, both to increase the property tax base and to relieve overcrowding. They also believed they owed their middle-class constituents a suburban life-style. More-
44.
Conway, "Decreasing Returns," 18; Bureau of Census, Railways 1902, ch. 3, 8; Holli, Reform in Detroit, 35. over, city politicians often had close ties with, suburban real estate developers who cultivated their friendship in order to get approval for the roads, sewers, water mains, and power hook-ups needed for subdividing. Influence at City Eall was a sine qua non for successful real estate promotion, for it brought not only governmental favours but also a more pliable attitude from public utilities holding municipal franchises. open up outlying lots. They generally found that profits from land speculation more than offset whatever deficits rail operations incurred.
Often in Canada, and occasionally in the United States, speculators also used street railways as expendable pawns in elaborate power promotion schemes. Thus, William Mackenzie and James Ross used Winnipeg's street railway to gain a strangle-hold over the distribu-45.
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First, it helped fashion a city with an unusually high population density and riding habit, in other words, one with an environment favorable to mass transit. Second, it slowed the flight of Toronto's middle class and industrial plants to the suburbs. The social consequences of this lag in Toronto's development must have been immense in terms of class relations, the city's tax structure, and employment opportunities for the inner city poor. Moreover, extrapolating from a recent study of American municipal reform, it may well be that the forced residence of the middle class in the core city accounted, at least in part, for the anachronistic persistence of "Toronto the Good" -the city with Protestant middle-class values -until mid-century.
Third, the tight-fisted policies of the TRC finally impelled the municipal government to organize its own civic railway in 1911 to service outlying areas boycotted by the private concern. Since the courts upheld the TRC's monopoly rights within Toronto's 1891 boundaries, the civic railway was unable to penetrate the central city and its passengers had to pay an additional fare to reach the central business district. For ten years -until the expiration of the TRC's franchiseToronto in effect had a zone fare system, as in much of Europe. By 1921, one hundred thousand passengers a day were paying multiple fares. Suburban middle-class commuters therefore contributed a fairer share of the actual costs of transporting them than in other North American cities whose flat fare system forced inner city residents to subsidize suburbanization. Fare zones disappeared in 1921 but the TTC later admitted the wisdom of the company's actions by instituting zones of its own for the suburban boroughs.
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The Toronto Railway Company bestowed one final benefit on the city: a system so small that the TTC could double it in size during the 1920s. Thus Toronto's system expanded rapidly while most American systems stagnated or contracted. As a result, the TTC enjoyed several advantages over American transit planners. Since the direction of Toronto's growth was by 1921 well established, the commission was able to place its routes rationally and precisely, deploying streetcars only in areas with sufficient traffic volume to support them. Moreover, the recent improvements in bus design gave TTC a cheaper, more flexible tool for developing traffic than street railways had ever provided.
The TTC accordingly became one of the first transit operators in Canada to add buses to its routes. It introduced them first to North Toronto, a district annexed in 1912 but ignored by the private traction company.
The new motor-bus route contributed to a housing boom that made possible the substitution of a more costly and permanent trolley-bus service the following year. And then in 1925 the trolley-buses gave way to streetcars. This close calibration of service with demand inevitably added to the TTC 1 s profit picture, contributing to its long-run viability.
What made it possible was the previous conservatism of the Toronto Railway Company. Had the private monopoly yielded to public opinion the 52 TTC might have inherited a system so large as to foreclose its options.
It might be objected that the poor surely suffered from the TRC's policies. One would assume that Toronto's high-density development sharpened competition for inner city housing to their detriment. Yet it is not clear that the poor actually suffered any more than usual under the TRC's regime. Living conditions in the slums of Toronto do not appear to have been worse than in cities with more expansion-minded street railways. Cleveland's traction monopoly was so addicted to building that it bankrupted itself in 1909 and yet that city in 1916 packed three times as many people into each acre of its tenement house district as 52.
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were found in the "Ward," Toronto's worst slum. On the other hand, Torontonians did pay high rents -second only to Winnipeg among Canada's twelve largest cities in 1921. But the city also ranked fourth among the twelve in home ownership and fifth in terms of persons per dwelling.
As Table III indicates, its standing was even more exceptional in the North American context, for only a handful of the major American cities could -despite their zeal in building street railways -compete with it in housing. The city was an anomaly that has to be explained by urban historians. Its development to 1921 suggests that the relationship between urban density and overcrowding is not as straight-forward as one might imagine. Further research, however, is needed to establish the precise impact of the TRC's restrictive policies. Such a study will probably show that the company's niggardly concern for profit most adversely affected the city's middle class by retarding their movement outward to the "crabgrass frontier.
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If true, then the final tribute 53 to the TRC might be that it postponed Toronto's suburban sprawl. V Avarice, poverty, monopoly, geography, and technological backwardness together laid the foundations for Toronto's success in urban transit. Had the city been wealthier between 1891 and 1921, its business world more competitive and progressive, or its transit company less crafty, it would not have earned its reputation twenty years later for possessing the best public transportation system in North America. As for the Toronto Railway Company, while its policies lacked the Napoleonic grandeur of those followed by street railways across the border, it did 53.
Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research, "What is 'The Ward' Going to do with Toronto?" (December, 1918) City of Toronto Archives, 68 (I wish to thank Greg Kealey for letting me see his copy of this report.); Sixth Census of Canada, 1921, III, Population, 11, 58-59, 66 . For a comparison of housing conditions in Montreal and Toronto see Terry Copp, The Anatomy of Poverty (Toronto, 1974) , ch. 5; Michael J. Piva, "The Condition of the Working Class in Toronto, 1900 -1921 ," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Concordia University (1975 , ch. 6; and Gregory S. Kealey, Hogtown: Working Class Toronto at the Turn of the Century (Toronto, 1974) . in its own conservative, penny-pinching way make a positive contribution to Toronto's development. Its legacy was two-fold: first, a consensusowing to its awesome unpopularity -in favour of municipal ownership that made it easier for the TTC to win popular approval; and second, a densely populated city with a high riding habit that made mass transit uniquely viable in Toronto. For three decades the TTC followed in the monopoly's footsteps, placing profit first among its goals. Granted it quickly pushed its routes past the boundaries arbitrarily set by the private company, but it too drew a line beyond which it refused to budge.
It kept its system -and the city -compact for another generation.
Since World War II, the preconditions for transit success have Company recede even farther into the past, and the time may soon come when
